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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
THE INVESTIGATION OF CORPORATE MONOPOLIES.-The Supreme Court of
the United States has recently given a clear and brief statement of its views
respecting the right of a corporation officer to refuse to testify on the ground
that his testimony may subject the corporation to a criminal prosecution.
Hale v. Henkel, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370. Hale was summoned before a grand
jury in a proceeding under the Sherman anti-trust act, and upon being in-
terrogated respecting certain transactions of the MacAndrews & Forbes Co.,
of which he was Secretary and Treasurer, refused to answer, on the ground
that the Federal immunity law was not broad enough to embrace corporations,
and that a corporation agent could therefore claim a constitutional right to
refuse to answer questions tending to incriminate such corporation.
To this plea, MR. JUSTICE BROWN, speaking for the Court, replied: "The
right of a person under the 5th amendment to refuse to incriminate himself
is purely a personal privilege of the witness. It was never intended to
permit him to plead the fact that some, third person might be incriminated by
his testimony, even though he were the agent of such person. A privilege
so extensive might be used to put a stop to the examination of every witness
who was called upon to testify before the grand jury with regard to the
doings or business of his principal, whether such principal were an individual
or a corporation... The amendment is limited to a person who shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; and if he cannot
set up the privilege of a third person, he certainly cannot set up the
privilege of a corporation. As the combination or conspiracies pro-
vided against by the Sherman anti-trust act can ordinarily be proved only by
the testimony of parties thereto, in the person of their agents or employees,
the privilege claimed would practically nullify the whole act of Congress. Of
what use would it be for the legislature to declare these combinations unlaw-
ful if the judicial power may close the door of access to every available source
of information upon the subject? Indeed, so strict is the rule that the privi-
lege is a personal one that it has been held in some cases that counsel will
not be allowed to make the objection. We hold that the questions should
have been answered." E. R. S.
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